ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.1

Negotiable Paper-Signatureas "Casier"--Parol Evidence to explain.-Where negotiable paper is drawn to a person by name with addition of" Cashier" to his name7, but with no designation of the particular
bank of which he was cashier, parol evidence is allowable to show that he
was the cashier of a bank which is plaintiff in the suit, and that in taking
the paper he was acting as cashier and agent of that corporation : Baldwin vs. Bank of Newbury.
Decree in Admiralty-Reversal for Irregularity.-Althoughthe language of a decree in admiralty may declare a decision which might not be
capable of being supported, still, if it is obvious from subsequent parts of
the record that no error has been committed, the Court will not reverse
for this circumstance.
Ex. Gr. Where a decree allowed a certain sum for repairs t'oa vessel,
and rejected (improperly perhaps) a claim for demurrage, the decree was
not reversed on that account; it appearing from a subsequent part of the
record that the judge had in fact considered the sum he allowed for repairs, eo nomine, was too large for repairs simply, but was "about just'
for repairs and demurrage together: Sturgis vs. (Iough.
Negotiable Bonds-Municipal Subscription to Stock, &c.-Authority
of.-An authority given by Act of Legislature to a city corporation to subscribe for stock in a railway company "as fully as any individual," authorizes also the issue by the city of its negotiable bonds in payment of
the stock. The opinion of the Supreme Court of a State taking this view
of an Act of Assembly passed by that state approved: Seybert vs. Pittsburgh.
Municipal Subscriptions to Railroads,&c.- ConstitutionalLaw- Contracts entered into on faith of Decisions of Court afterwards overruledDeference by tlis Court to Decisions of State Courts on State Laws.-By
a series of decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa prior to that, A: D. 1859,
in The State ex rel. The Burlington and Missouri River Railroad Co.
vs. Walpedlo Co. (13 Iowa 388), the right of the Legislature of that state
to authorize municipal corporations to subscribe to railroads extending
beyond the limits of the city or county, and to issue bonds accordingly.
1 From J. W.Wallace, Esq., Reporter, to appear in Vol. I. of his Reports.
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was settled in favor of the right; and those decisions meeting with theapprobation of this court, and being in harmony with the adjudications
of sixteen states of the Union, will be regarded as a true interpretation
of the constitution and laws of the state, so far as relate to bonds issued
and put upon the market during the time that those decisions were in
force. The fact that the Supreme Court of Iowa now holds that those
decisions were erroneous, and ought not to have been made, and that the
Legislature of the state had no such power as former courts decided that
it had, can have no effect upon transactions in the past, however it may
affect those in the future: Gelpcke et al.vs. Dubugue.
Although it is the practice of this Court to follow the latest settled adjudications of the itate courts giving constructions to the laws and constitutions of their own states, it will not necessarily follow decisions which
may prove but oscillations in the.course of such judicial settlement. Nor
will it follow any adjudication to such an extent as to make a sacrifice of
truth, justice, and law: .7d.
Municipal bonds with coupons payable to "bearer," having, by universa1
usage and consent, all the qualities of commercial paper, a party recovering on the coupons will be entitled to the amount of them with interest
and exchange at the place where, by their terms, they are made pay.
able: Id.
Alieus-Powerto hold Lands-Law ofRhode Island relatingto.-The
well-settled principle that aliens may take land by deed or devise, and hold
against any one but the sovereign until office found, holds in Rhode Island
as elsewhere; not being affected by that statute which allows them to
hold land, "provided" they previously obtain a license from the Probate
Court: Cross vs. De Valle.
Although equity will, in some cases, interfere to assert and protect future
rights, as, ex.gr., to protect the estate of a remainderman from waste by the
tenant for life, or to cut down an estate claimed to be a fee to a life interest
only, where the language, rightly construed, gives but .an interest for
fife; or will, at the request of trustees asking protection under a will, and
to have a construction of the will and the direction of the court as to the
disposition of the property, yet it will not decree in thesi as to the future
rights of parties not before the court or in esse: Id.
Langdale vs. Briggs (39 Eng. Law and Eq. 214), followed and approved, distinguished from Lorilardvs. Coster and Hawley vs. James (5
Paige 172, 442): -d.
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SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS.

1

Swamp Lands-Characterof the Grant to the State.-By the grant
of swamp and overflowed lands to the state of Illinois, under the provibions of the Act of Congress of September 28th, 1850, to enable the state
of Arkansas and other states to reclaim the " swamp lands" within their,
limits, a fee-simple estate passed unconditionally. The state became the
absolute owner of the lands, with power to dispose of them in such manner, and for such purposes, as to the Legislature might seem most expedient: Supervisors of Whiteside Co. vs. Burcell et al.
Swamp Lands-Policyof the State.-It was the intention of the General Assembly, under the various acts on the subject, to grant to the several
counties in the state the swamp and overflowed lands within their limits,
respectively, and to remit to such counties the exclusive control.oyer these
lands, and over their proceeds : Id.
Swamp Lands-Rights of Purchasers-Obligationof Counties.--So,
where a party purchased swamp lands from a county in 1856, and executed his notes for the absolute payment of the purchase-money, he€ has
no remedy to compel the county to appropriate the proceeds of the sales
of such lands-to their reclamation, as was contemplated by the legislation
on the subject, in force at the time of his purchase; but his rights in
that regard are to be determined by the policy subsequently adopted by
the Legislature, which placed the whole subject of the control of these
lands, and the appropriation of their proceeds, in the hands of the several
counties, and released them from all the liabilities and obligations theretofore imposed upon them respecting them: 1d.
And where such purchaser claimed the right to pay the purchasemoney for which he had given his notes, in labor to be bestowed in the
reclamation of the lands, it was held, that he could in no way have insisted upon such right, except by being the lowest bidder at the lettings
of the work under the Act of June 22d, 1852, and that under the subsequent legislation, the county was under no obligation to carry out the
system of reclamation of the lands as contemplated by that act: Id.
Power of Courts over the Legislature.-Even if the grant of the swamp
lands to the state had been made upon the trust that the proceeds of the
lands should be expended in reclaiming them. such a trust would have
1 From Norman L. Freeman, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 31 Illinois Reports
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been of municipal and not fiducial concern, over which the power of the
state would have been plenary and exclusive. The courts have no power
to compel the legislature to execute such a trust: Id.
Aorlyage with power of Sale-Foredosure in Eguity.-A mortgage

contained a power of sale on notice by advertisement. The mortgagee
filed his bill in equity to foreclose, making the subsequent incumbrancers
parties defendant. Pending the bill, the mortgagee advertised and sold
to A., who had no actual notice of the pendency of the Ibreclosure suit.
B., a subsequent mortgagee, and defendant in the foreclosure suit, filed
his cross-bill to redeem from the first mortgage, and to have the sale to
A. set aside Beld 1st, that it was a fraud to advertise and sell under the
power while the foreclosure suit was pending, and that the purchaser at
that, sale was chargeable with notice of the suit pending; 2d, that A.,
the purchaser at that sale, was a proper party defendant to the cross.bill:
Jiurd et al. vs. Cone et aL
SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

Dower.-The widow is entitled to dower in the lands which her husband held under an. inchoate title, although he may have conveyed it
prior to the confirmation; and, to the extent of her dower, the widow is
the representative of the claimants: Margaret Thomas vs. Frederick
Besse et al.
Dawer-Conveyance.-If the husband sell the land without the relin-

quishment of dower by the wife, she will be endowed in accordance with
the law in force at the time of the husband's conveyance. Under the
statutes of 1825, the wife is not barred by the fact that the husband owed
debts at the date of his deed or the time of his death, unless the claims
of the creditors be properly enforced. A third person cannot set up the
debt as a bar to the action for dower: Id.
Dower-Action.-Where the alienees of the husband have subdivided
the land, which is held in several parcels, the dower of the widow shall be
assigned in each parcel separately: Id.
Eyt-Trsts.-An agent who buys with his own fuids, at a public
sale by third parties, the reversionary estate in the lands of his principal1
1From Charles C. Whittlesey, Esq., Reporter; to appear in Vol. XXXIV. of

Missouri Reports.
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will not be held a trustee for his principal unless he purchased under an
agreement to that effect: Ophelia Kennedy vs. Mary Keating et al

WiZ-Devise.-A will made in 1824, and properly attested, provided
as follows :-" I do nominate for my sole and only heir of all the goods,
chattels, rights and credits, and effects, which I shall be possessed of at
the time of my death, I do bequeath the whole unto my adopted cLild,
Sophia," &c., "to inherit and enjoy all and singular the said goods, chattels, rights, credits, and effects, which I shall be possessed of at the time
of my death." Hdd, that real estate did not pass by the will: Jamcs
B. Brown vs. Jacques Furman.
Practice-Negigence.-Negligence and unskilfulness are matters of

fact, and their existence is a question for the jury. A court cannot direct
a jury that such or such supposed facts show or do not show negligence:
Bertha Huelsenkamp vs. Citiens' Railway Company.

Damages-Negligence,-Inan action against a carrier, under the statute for the better security of life, &c. (1 R. 0. 647), if the "deceased was
killed by reason of his voluntarily taking an improper or dangerous position Ay which he lost his life, the carrier is not liable: Id.
SAction- Contract.-Sub-contractors,not contracting with the owner of

a building, but with a person with whom the owner agreed for the coii4truction, are not liable to the owner in an action for negligently and unskilfully doing their work, by which the owner is injured. There is no
privity of contract. The action must be brought against the principal
contractor: Geo. R. Bissell vs. David Roden et al.

Note-Interest.-A note for a certain sum, "with ten per cent. interest
'hereon till paid," carries interest from date: Rail W Pittman vs.
RWcliard F. Barret et al.
Administration- Trust.-Where a party, acting as executor de son tort,

procures a lease of premises which had been previously held by his testator. but which had been forfeited for non-payment of rent, he will hold
the property as trustee for the benefit of the. distributees or representa.
tives of the deceased: Geo. Lich vs. John L. Bernicker et al.

Landlordand Tenant.--:A tenant, holding under a lease for a definite
period of years, which requires the landlord to pay the appraised value
of the buildings erected by the tenant and remaining at the expiration of
the lease, cannot hold over the possession after the term, on the ground
that he has not been paid such value by his landlord, unless such authority

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.

be given by the terms of the lease. The tenant must seek his remedy by
action upon the lease: Theresa ,Speers vs. Thomas Flack.
Banks-Porfeiture.-A debtor sued by one of the banks of this state
cannot plead, in bar of the suit, that the bank has suspended payment of
its liabilities in specie, and has thereby forfeited its charter by virtue of
the provisions of § 9, art. 1, of the act of incorporation. (Sess. Acts,
1856-7, p. 17.) Such a forfeiture can only be enforced by the state in a
direct proceeding for that purpose: The Farmrs' Bank vs. Andrew
Garten et al.
Note-Indorser.-A party indorsing a blank note cannot, as against an
indorsee for value without notice, object that the blanks have been filled
contrary to the agreement made between the parties: Id.
Banks.-A debtor to a bank cannot plead, as a defence to a suit by the
bank, that it has refused to redeem its five-dollar notes in coin; or that
it has not kept in its vaults the amount of coin required by its charter.
Such violations of the law cannot be inquired into collaterally,- but only
by some direct proceeding on the part of the state: Id.
Covenant.-A. sold to B. a part interest in a steamboat, and covenanted
to put B. in possession and command of the boat as captain. A. put B.
in possession and command, but subsequently B. was removed from his
command by the owners, and another person placed in charge. In a suit
upon the covenant by B. against A., held, that A. was not bound to maintain B. in his command of the boat: isaac E. .McKee et al. vs. Jos.
Kinney.
Vendor's .Lien.-The vendor of land who has given his bond ftr a conveyance upon full payment of the notes given for the purchase-money,
cannot be required to convey to an assignee of the vendee until the purchase-money be paid, although he may have given up the notes and have
accepted a new note from the vendee with collateral security: Geo. T.
Johnson vs. Elijah Scott et al.
BRils and Notes-ilegal Banking.-The indorsee of a bill or note even
with notice takes the instrument, subject only to such defences and equities as attach to the instrument itself. That a corporation indorsing a
note had violated the provisions of the act concerning illegal banking, R.
U. 1855, see. 4 and 5, by receiving and passing the notes of non-specie.
paying and foreign banks, does not affect the note itself, but is a defence
only when the party is sued by the corporation: William Aottoon vs.
Win. G. McDaniel.
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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK.

1

Evidenc-3 of apert.-Evidence by an expert that a machine was not
constructed in a workmanlike manner is admissible, though the party
offer;ug the evidence decline to follow it by proof of the particulars in
which the machine was defective: Curtis vs. Gano et al.
Railroad Company-Exaction of greater Fare than allowed by Law.

-The penalty imposed by chapter 185 of 1857 upon a railroad corporation for exacting a greater rate of fare than is allowed by law, is incurred
where its conductor illegally required five cents in addition to the legal
fare, because the passenger had no ticket: Chase vs. The . . Central
B. R. Co.

Chapter 228 of 1857 allows the charge, of five cents for not having a
ticket only when the company has its ticket office, at the station' where
the passenger starts, opedi at the time of starting, though this be at mid.
night, and the statute imposes no duty upon the corporation of keeping
its ticket offices open after 9 P. m.. Id.
Insurance-Evidenceof receipt of Premium- Waiver of Conditions 6y

Agent.-The acknowledgment in a fire policy of the receipt of premium
does not, it seems, estop the insurer from showing that it has.not been paid.
It is evidence, but not conclusive : Sheldon et al. vs. Atlantic Ins. Co.
The cases rolating to marine insurance by brokers, who kept open accounts with the underwriters and assured, and credited -the one, and
were allowed by the other for the premium as paid, discriminated, by
EMOTT, J.: Id.

A general agent of the insurer may waive a condition in the policy'that
no insurance should be considered as binding until actual payment of the
premium: Id.
Where the agent sent a policy by mail to an applicant for insurance,
with a statement that the premium charged was higher than usual, and
saying, "Should you decline the policy, please return it by mail; if you
retain it, please send me the premium"-eld,that this was a waiver of
prepayment, and that the policy became effectual upon the insured retaining and thereby accepting it, or, at all events, that the question should
have been submitted to the jury: Id.
such case will be set aside on exceptions, though the plainA nonsuit in.
tiff did not expressly ask that the evidence be submitted to the jury: Id.
1 To appear in'Vol. XII. of E. P. Smith's Reports.
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Bank-Receipt of Notes for collection- Title to Notes so received-As.
signment of cause of Action-Fraud in Assignment.-A bank, receiving
from another notes for collection, obtains no better title to them, or the
proceeds, than the remitting bank had, unless it becomes a purchaser for
value without notice of any defect of title: McBride vs. The Farmer's
Bank.
It is not a purchaser for value by reason of its having a balance against
the remitting bank, for which it had refrained from drawing, and from
having discounted notes for the latter upon its indorsement, in reliance
upon a course of dealings between the banks to collect notes for each
other, each keeping an open account of such collections, treating all the
paper sent for collection as the property of the other, and drawing for
balances at pleasure : Id.
The remitting bank, having demanded the notes before maturity and
the proceeds afterwards, and both of them being foreign corporations, assigned its demand to the plaintiff. No new demand was necessary to
enable him to sustain an action, nor is it an objection that his assignor, as
i foreign corporation, could not have sued out an attachment against another foreign corporation on a cause of action not arising in this state: .d.
The cause of action is assignable, notwithstanding any personal disability
of the assignor or the assignee to maintain an action in this state: Id.
It is no fraud against our statute or the defendant to assign the cause
of action to a resident, to obviate the objection to an attachment by a nonresident. If it were, it lies with the defendant to prove the fraud, by
showing the assignor's knowledge that the plaintiff was a resident; and it
seems that the objection is waived by a full appearance to the action: Id.
Mutual Insurance Company-Divisionof Risks-Insolvent Corporation
-Receivers Erxpenses.-A mutual insurance company, organized under
the general law (ch. 308 of 1849), may divide its business and risks into
distinct departments, or classes, pledging the premiums received in each
department as the primary fund for the payment of losses in that department: Sands vs. Boutwell.
Whether a provision is valid which exempts premium notes received in
one department from liability to assessment for losses incurred in another
department, quwre: Id.
The receiver of an insolvent corporation organized under this act may
include in his assessment a reasonable sum for the expenses of making
and collecting the same. In the absence of any proof to the contrary, ten
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per cent. upon the amount of losses assumed to be a reasonable charge for
such expenses: Id.
Where the by-laws required the notice of assessment to be published in
one newspaper in the county of M., "and in such other newspapers as the
directors may deem necessary," it seems that a publication in one news.
paper in N. county is sufficient, unless a direction for further publication
by the directors be shown: Id
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORKj

Madicious Prosecution-ProbableCause--Judgment, how far Evidence
of- Testimony of Parties.-A judgment in favor of the plaintiff, in a
justice's court, after a trial upon the merits, is sufficient evidence of probable cause to defeat an action against him for malicious prosecution,
although on appeal to the county court it is reversed upon another trial:
Palmervs. Avery.
It is not, however, conclusive evidence of probable cause, but may be
impeached for fraud, conspiracy, perjury, or subornation: Id.
Where no such evidence is offered to impeach the prior judgment, it is
the duty of the court to order a nonsuit: .d.
The plaintiff is not competent to prove by his own oath, against that
of the defendant, that the former judgment was obtained against him by
the perjury of the defendant, when the question depends upon their credibility as witnesses: Id.
Want of probable cause cannot be inferred solely from the discontinuance of former suits. If the last suit resulted in a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff, it furnishes sufficient evidence of probable cause to defeat
an action brought by the defendant thereon against the plaintiff for malicious prosecution of the prior suits: Id.
Partnership-Divisionof Assets between Partners.-A division by partners of the partnership assets between themselves, and the transfer of
such assets by the individual partners in payment of their private debts,
when the partnership is insolvent, is in point of law a fraud upon the
creditors of the partnership.
Such a transfer of the partnership effects is invalid, as against the creditors of the firm, and the property remains partnership property until it
comes to the hands of a bond fide purchaser for a valuable and new consideration : Id.
I From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, to appear in Vol. XLI. of his Reports.
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If the person to whom the property is transferred has notice that it is
partnership property, and he takes it in payment of a precedent debt, he
will not be deemed a bondfide purchaser: Id.
se of Property-Damagesfor negligent Use.-The right of every one
to use his own property as he pleases, for all the purposes to which such
property is usually applied, is unlimited and unqualified up to the point
where the particular use becomes a nuisance: Fisher vs. Clark.
Simply turning one's own sheep, having an infectious disease, into his
own lot, adjoining the lot of another, occupied by sheep, is not unlawful,
nor such an act of wrong or negligence as will give to the owner of the
adjoining lot a legal cause of action for damage sustained in consequence
of the disease being communicated to his sheep: Id.
Rdlief to Fartiesengaged in the Perpetrationof a Fraud,&c., as parti.
ceps criminis, as against each other.-If parties engaged in the perpetration of a fraud, or concurring in the fraudulent purpose, as particeps
criminis, are in par delieto, neither can have relief as against the other,
at law or in equity. But as there are degrees of crime, the courts can
and do give relief in many cases as against the more guilty party: Freelove and Wife vs. Cole.
C. having obtained from F. and his wife, without consideration, a conveyance of a farm, upon a parol promise or agreement to take and hold
the title until F.'s debts were arranged or paid, and then to convey the
land to F.'s wife: Held, that he could not resist the claim of F. and wife
that the parol agreement be specifically executed on the ground that the
conveyance was made by F. to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors:
or on the ground that the agreement was within the statute declaring all
parol trusts relating to land void: Id.
To exclude relief in such cases, the parties must not only be in delicto,
but in par delicto.
Where the parties to a conveyance did not stand on an equal footing,
the grantor being infirm of mind, and incompetent to manage his business
affairs with ordinary prudence and discretion, and the grantee was his
son-in-law, confidential friend, and legal adviser, and was applied to for
advice on this occasion: Eeld, that the grantor was not prevented from
applying to a court of equity to enforce the performance of a parol agreement by the grantee, to reconvey the premises, although the object and
intention of the grantor, in making the conveyance, was to place his property beyond the reach of his creditors, and the conveyance was in fact
fraudulent as against such creditors: Id.

